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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
VALLEY INVESTMENT CO., 
a Corporation, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
LOS ANGELES & SALT LAKE RAIL~ 
ROAD COIVlPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Defendant and 
Res-pondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7300 
The record shows that the above-entitled case came 
on for trial before the Honorable Roald A. Hogenson, one 
of the judges of the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, sitting without a jury, 
on the 7th day of April, 1948, William D. Callister 
appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff, and A. U. Miner ap-
pearing on behalf of the Defendant. 
The record further shows that the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant, in open court, stipulated as follows, to-wit: 
On March 29th, 1894, one Charles A. Dole had the 
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fee title to all of Lots 3 to 20, inclusive, and Lots 53 to 58, 
inclusive, of Block 5, and all of Lots 13 to 16, inclusive, 
Block 6, Dole's Addition, located in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah (Tr. 40 and 41). On the said March 29th, 
1894, the said Charles A. Dole conveyed said property to 
Osca£ F. Hunter (Tr. 41), and the chain of title descended 
through various parties (Tr. 41 to 46, inclusive) , to one 
Irene Hunter Chamberlain, who, on February 29th, 1936, 
received title through a bargain and sale deed. (Tr. 46) 
On November 21st, 1947, the said Irene Hunter Chamber-
lain, now known as Irene H. Chamberlain McAlpine; ex-
ecuted a quit-claim deed to the said property to Valley In-
vestment Co., the Plaintiff herein (Tr. 47, and Exhibit 
uA", Tr. 79). 
The general property taxes for 1930 on said property 
being unpaid, a treasurer's tax sale took place on December 
22nd, 1930 (Tr. 49, and Exhibit No.2, Tr. 79). The taxes 
for the years 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934, and 1935 also remain-
ing unpaid, and there having been no redemption of the 
treasurer's sale for the unpaid 1930 taxes, an auditor's tax 
deed on said property was executed on March 31st, 1936, 
to Salt Lake County (Tr. 49, and Exhibit No. 3, Tr. 79). 
On November 7th, 1941, Salt Lake c·ounty executed a 
deed to said lots, naming Defendant as grantee (Tr. 49 and 
SO, and Exhibit No. 4, Tr. 79). The assessment rolls of 
Salt Lake County for 1930, and particularly the volume in 
which said property was assessed, did not have affixed 
thereto the· two auditor's affidavits required by Sections 
5982 and 6006, Compiled Laws of Utah 1917 (Sections 
80-7-9 and. 80-8-7, Utah Code Annotated 1943) (Tr. 69 
and 70). 
The Defendant has paid all taxes assessed against said 
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property for the years 1942 to 1947, inclusive (Tr. 50), 
and has been in possession of said property from August, 
1941, to the present time, the Plaintiff and its predecessors 
in interest having not physically occupied said property 
since March 31st, 1936 (Tr. 51 to 67, inclusive). 
After the trial had been concluded, and in due course, 
the Court found in favor of the Defendant and against the 
Plaintiff (Tr. 16), and made and entered its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment (Tr. 25 to 32, 
inclusive) , to which Plaintiff objected, submitting there-
with its own proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and decree (Tr. 17 to 24, inclusive). 
The particular portions of the Findings, Conclusions 
and Judgment to which Plaintiff objected, are set out be-
low (italics added) : 
uFINDINGS OF FACT" 
u6. That under date of February 29,_ 1936, Mindwell 
C. Hunter by a bargain and sale deed conveyed or purport-
ed to convey to Irene Hunter Chamberlain McAlpine the 
property hereinabove described. That on November 21, 
1947, by quit-claim deed said Irene Hunter Chamberlain 
McAlpine conveyed or purported to convey said property 
to the plaintiff Valley Investment Co." (Tr. 26) 
u7 ........ That said taxes as so assessed for the year 
1930 were not paid to Salt Lake County, and that on the 
22nd day of December, 1930, a Treasurer's sale of such 
property for delinquent taxes was made to Salt Lake 
County. That thereafter said taxes were not paid nor :re·-
deemed and on the 31st day of March, 19 3 6, pursuant to 
the provisions of Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
Utah of 1933, said property was struck off to Salt Lake 
County and an auditor's deed issued to Salt Lake County 
therefor based upon said sale which had been made on the 
22nd day of December, 1930, on account of said delinquent 
and unpaid taxes assessed for the year 1930." (Tr. 27) 
u9. That although said property was on December 
22, 1930, sold for delinquent taxes assessed in 1930, said 
property was not at any time thereafter redeemed by plain-
tiff nor by any of the predecessors in interest of the plain-
tiff, nor were any of the taxes paid thereon, and subsequent 
taxes for the years 19 31 to 19 3 5, inclusive, were not paid 
and were added thereto; that after the issuance of the 
auditor's deed to Salt Lake County on March 31, 1936, 
said property was carried on the county rolls as property 
of Salt Lake County and no taxes were assessed against nor 
paid upon the same, and during the summer of 1941 the 
defendant Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company ne-
gotiated with the County for the purchase of said property 
for the purpose of constructing thereover a spur track to 
serve the Remington Arms Plant. That as a result of said 
negotiations and for a valuable consideration the defendant 
Railroad Company purchased said property from the Coun-
ty and under date of November 7, 1941, Salt Lake County 
made, executed and delivered to the defendant a county 
deed by which it conveyed or purported to convey to the 
defendant the property h·ereinabove described." (Tr. 27 
and 28) 
u12. That the above described real p·roperty was struck 
off and sold to Salt Lake County on March 31, 1936, pur-
suant to the provisions of Section 8 0-1 0-66, Revised 
Statutes of 1933; that h')' amendment contained in Chap-
ter 101 of Laws of Utah of 1939, various portions of Chap-
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fer 10 of Title 80 of Revised Statutes of Utah 1933 1vere 
amended and by such amendment the provisions of Sec-
tion 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, relating to 
property being struck off to the County, were transferred 
to and embodied in Section 80-10-68, Sub. 6, and said Sec-
tion 80-10-68 as so amended was thereafter incorporated 
in and carried unchanged into Utah Code Annotated 1943 
as Section 80-10-68." (Tr. 28 and 29) 
u13. That although the real property hereinabove de-
scribed was sold to Salt Lake County for delinque·nt taxes 
on the 22nd day of December, 1930, and although said 
property was struck o.ff to Salt Lake County pursuant to 
Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, and an 
auditor's deed therefor issued to the County on the 31st 
day of March, 1936, and in spite of the fact that the de-
fendant received a deed to said property from the County 
under date of November 7, 1941, and went into possession 
and has held possession of the same since November 7, 1941, 
neither the Plaintiff nor any predecessor in interest or title 
of the plaintiff has filed nor attempted to file any action 
for the recovery of said property or for the possession there-
of during any of said period of time, nor at all, until the 
above entitled action was commenced herein by the filing 
of Plaintiff's complaint on the lOth day of January, 1948." 
(Tr. 29) 
((CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
u1. That the cause of action set forth or attempted to 
be set forth by plaintiff in its complaint is bar.red by the 
provisions of Section 104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 
1943, as so designated and enacted by Chapter 19, page 22, 
Laws of Utah 1943. (Tr. 29) 
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u2. That the cause of action set forth or attempted 
to be set forth by plaintiff in its complaint is barred. by the 
prov:isions of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1943, des1gnated 
as Section 104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as 
amended by Chapter 8, page 19, Laws of Utah 1947. (Tr. 
29 and 30) 
u 3. That the cause of action set forth or attempted to 
be set forth by plaintiff in its complaint is barred by the 
provisions of Section 104-2-6, Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
as amended by Chapter 20, page 22, Laws of Utah 1943. 
(Tr. 30) 
u4. That the defendant is entitled to a judgment in its 
favor and against the plaintiff, tno cause of action.'" 
(Tr. 30) 
UJUDGMENT 
uNow, therefore, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and 
decreed that the defendant Los Angeles & Salt Lake Rail-
road Company, a corporation, be and it is hereby given 
judgment in its favor and against the Plaintiff Valley In-
vestment Co., a corporation, cno cause of action,' and Plain-
tiff's complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice. (Tr. 31) 
celt is further ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the 
Plaintiff Valley Investment Co., a corporation, be and it 
is hereby barred and enjoined and prevented from hereafter 
prosecuting or maintaining any action for the recovery 
of the following described property or for the possession 
of any part or portion thereof, to-wit: 
Lots 3 to 20 and Lots 53 to 58 of Block 5; and Lots 
13 to 16 of Block 6, Dole's addition. (T r. 31) 
ult is further ordered that defendant be . . d giVen JU g-
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ment for its costs herein incurred, hereafter to be taxed., 
(Tr. 32) 
After having been served with a copy of the findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, portions of 
which are set out above, and prior to the time the Court 
signed the same, the Plaintiff prepared and served on the 
Defendant, and filed with the Court, its proposed findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and decree, portions of which 
are set out below, in the place and stead of those signed 
and filed by the Court: 
((PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
u6. That under date of February 29th, 1936, Mind-
well C. Hunter executed a bargain and sale deed conveying 
said property to the said Irene Hunter Chamberlain; that 
on the 21st day of November, 1947, Irene Hunter Cham-
berlain McAlpine, formerly Irene Hunter Chamberlain, 
by quit-claim deed, conveyed all her right, title and interest 
in and to said property to the Plaintiff herein, Valley In-
vestment Co." (Tr. 18) 
u7 .......... that said taxes as so assessed for the year 
1930 were not paid to Salt Lake County and that on the 
22nd day of December, 1930, a purported Treasurer's Sale 
of such property for delinquent taxes was made to Salt 
Lake County; that thereafter, said taxes were not paid, 
and on the 31st day of March, 1936, pursuant to the pro-
visions of Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933., 
an auditor's tax deed was issued to Salt Lake County there-
for, based upon the said purported Treasurer's Sale which 
had been made on the said 22nd day of December, 1930, 
on account of said delinquent and unpaid taxes assessed 
for the year 1930." (Tr. 18 and 19) 
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u9. That neither the Plaintiff nor its predecessors in 
interest have paid the said taxes for the year 19 30, nor for 
the years 1931 to 1935, inclusive; that after March 31st, 
19 3 6, the said property was carried on the tax rolls of Salt 
Lake County as p~roperty of Salt Lake County, and were 
not assessed· that on the 7th day of November, 1941, for a 
' . 
valuable consideration, Salt Lake County made, executed 
and delivered to the Defendant a county tax deed describ-
ing the property mentioned above." (~r. 19) 
u12. That since the Defendant took possession of the 
property herein described, in August, 1941, no action was 
brought heretofore against this Defendant, by the Pl~in­
ti:ff or its predecessors in interest; that the Defendant has 
held adversely against this Plaintiff and its predecessors for 
a period of six years and five months, and no longer; that 
the Plaintiff and its predecessors have not been in actual 
physical occupancy of said property during the said pe-
riod." (Tr. 20) 
((PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
c ( 1. That the assessment of taxes on the property de-
scribed above, for the year 1930, and the Treasurer's Sale 
on the 22nd day of December, 1930, of the same, are null 
and void. (Tr. 20) 
u2. That the· auditor's tax deed executed by the audi-
tor of Salt Lake C'ounty, on the 31st day of March, 1936, 
in favor of Salt Lake County, is null and void and is of no 
' 
effect, and no interest in an~ to said property passed to 
the County of Salt Lake by VIrtue of it. (Tr. 20) 
u3. That the payment of the consideration to Salt Lake 
County by the Defendant herein, on the 7th day of No· 
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vember, 1941, for a purported tax title, extinguished the 
lien for taxes and freed the property concerned from the 
encumbrance whlch theretofore existed; that the tax deed 
made, executed and delivered by Salt Lake County, on the 
said 7th day of November, 1941, to the Defendant, de-
scribing said property, conveyed no inte·rest in and to said 
property to the said Defendant; that Plaintiff is ov1ner of 
the fee title to the same. (Tr. 20) 
u4. That the predecessor of the Plaintiff he·rein, hold-
ing legal title_ to the said property, by virtue of the provis-
ions of Section 104-2-7, Utah Code Annotated 1943, also 
held constructive possession of t4e property concerned un-
til the month of Auglist, 1941, which included the first 
seven months of ·the se~en-year p·eriod immediately· prior 
to the commencement of this. action; that the Plaintiff's 
predecessor in interest thus held possession of the property 
within seven years prior to the commencement of th~s 
action, as required by the provisions of Sectior1 104-2-5, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943. (Tr. 20) 
tt5. That the property described above, was not con-
veyed to the County of Salt Lake by auditor's ·tax deed, 
and therefore does not come within the provisions of Chap-
ter 19, page 22, Laws of Utah, 1943, designated as Section 
104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended by 
Chapter 8, page 19, Laws of Utah, 1947. (Tr. 20 and 21) 
u6. That Chapter 19, page 22, Laws of Utah 1943, 
designated as Section 104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 
1943, as amended by Chapter 8, page 19, Laws of Utah 
1947, does not provide a reasonable time in which to bring 
actions which accrued prior to the time of its enactment, 
for the recovery of real property conveyed to Salt Lake 
County prior to September 1st, 1939, by auditor's deed 
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under the provisions of Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes 
of Utah 1933; that the provisions of the said Chapter 19, 
page 22, Laws of Utah 1943, designated as Section 104-
2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended by Chap-
ter 8, page 19, Laws of Utah 1947, insofar as the same relate 
to real p~roperty conveyed to the county prior to September 
1st, 1939, by auditor's tax deed, are un;constitutional and 
therefore void. (Tr. 21) 
u7. That the Plaintiff herein is entitled to a decree of 
this Court declaring, ordering and adjudging that the 
Plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of said real property, 
and that the Defendant has no right, title, estate, lien or 
interest whatever in or to said real property or any part 
thereof. (Tr. 21) 
ns. That the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of this 
Court forever enjoining and debarring the said Defendant 
f,rom asserting any claim whatever in or to said real prop-
erty adverse to the Plaintiff herein. (T r. 21) 
u9. That the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of this 
Court for all costs of court herein expended." (Tr. 21) 
UPROPOSED JUDGMENT 
uNow, therefore, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and 
decreed: 
u 1. That the Plaintiff, Valley Investment Co., a cor-
poration, is the owner in fee simple of the property de-
scribed below, and that the Defendant, Los Angeles & Salt 
Lake Railroad Company, a corporation, has no right, title, 
interest, estate orJien whatever in or to said property or 
any part thereof: 
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Lots 3 to 20, inclusive, and Lots 53 to 58, inclusive, 
Block 5, and Lots 13 to 16, inclusive, Block 6, Dole's 
Addition. (Tr. 22) 
uz. That the Defendant, Los Angeles & Salt Lake Rail-
road Company, a corporation, be and it is hereby forever 
enjoined and debarred from asserting any claim whatever 
in and to the said real property described abov.e, adverse 
to the Plaintiff herein. (Tr. 22) 
u3. That the Plaintiff, Valley Investment Co., be and 
the same is hereby awarded its costs herein expended, here-
after to be taxed." (T r. 22) 
Subsequent to the signing and filing of the findings 
of fact, conclusions of law· and judgment by the said Court, 
the Plaintiff filed. its motion for a ·new trial (Tr .. 3 3), 
which was subsequently denied (Tr. 3 5). 
·Appellant, the Plaintiff below, contends that the trial 
Court, in making and entering ·its findings, conclusions 
and judgment, and in denying Plaintiff's motion for a new 
trial, committed error as follows: 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
Error No.1. 
The fact found by the trial court in its finding No. 6 
(Tr. 26) to the effect that Mindwell C. Hunter uconveyed 
or pu·rported to convey" the property involve·d in this ac-
tion, to Irene Hunter Chamberlain McAlpine, who later 
((conveyed or purported to convey" the said property to 
the Appellant, does not conform to the· stipulated and un-
disputed evidence produced at the trial. 
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Error No.2 
The fact found by the trial court in its finding No. 
7 (Tr. 27) to the effect that a treas:urer's sale of the prop-
erty conce·rned to Salt Lake County took place, and that 
said property was ustruck. off" to Salt Lake County, is con-
trary to the stipulated and undisputed evidence produced 
at the trial. 
Error No. 3. 
The fact found by the trial court in its finding No.9 
(Tr. 27 and 28) to the effect that said property was usold" 
for delinquent taxes assessed in 1930, and that during the 
summer of 1941, the Respondent unegotiated'' for the 
purchase of, and did upurchase, said property, does not 
conform to the stipulated and undisputed eviden~e pro-
duced at the trial. 
Error No. 4. 
The fa.ct found by the trial court in its finding No. 
12 (Tr. 28) to the effect that said property was tcstruck 
off and sold" to Salt Lake County, is contrary to the stip-
ulated and undisputed evidence produced at the trial. 
Error No. 5. 
The fact found by the trial court in its finding No. 
12 (Tr. 28 and 29) to the effect that by amendment Sec-
tion 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, reiating 
to property being ustruck off" to the county, were trans-
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ferred to and embodied in Section 80-10-68, Sub. 6, is 
contrary to fact and law. 
Error No. 6. 
The fact found l?Y the trial court in its finding No. 
13 (Tr. 29) to the effect that said real property was usold" 
to Salt Lake County in 1930, and was ustruck off" to 
Salt Lake County in 1936, is contrary to the stipulated 
and undisputed evidence produced at the trial. 
Error No. 7. 
The trial court erred in not finding the facts as pro-
posed by the Plaintiff herein -(Tr. · 18 to .20, inclusive), 
particularly paragraphs 6, 7, 9, and 12 thereof. 
Error No. 8. 
That the conclusion of law No.· 1 (Tr. 29) to the 
effect that Plaintiff's caus.e of action is barred by the pro-
visions of Section 104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated, as 
so designated and enacted by Chapter 19, page 22, Laws 
of Utah 1943, is erroneous and contrary to law. 
-Error No.9 
That the con.clusion of law No.2 (Tr. 29 and 30) to 
the effect that Plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the 
provisions of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1943, designated 
as Section 104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as 
amended by Chapter 8, page 19, Laws of Utah 1947, is 
erroneous and contrary to law. 
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Error No. 10. 
That the conclusion of law No. 3 (Tr. 30) to the 
effect that Plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the pro-
visions of Section 104-2-6, Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
as amended by Chapter 20, page 22, Laws of Utah 1943, 
is erroneous and contrary to law. 
Error No. 11. 
l 
That the conclusion of law No. 4 (Tr. 31) to the 
effect that Defendant is entitled to a judgment in its favor 
of uno cause of action", is erroneous and contrary to law. 
Error No. 12. 
That the trial court erred in not concluding as a mat-
ter of law that the assessment of taxes for 1930 on said 
property, and the Treasurer's Sale on December 22nd, 
1930, are null and void. (Proposed conclusion No. 1, 
Tr. 20) 
Error No. 13. 
That the trial court erred in not concluding as a mat-
ter of law that the auditor's tax deed (Exhibit No. 3, Tr. 
79) is null and void, and that no interest in said property 
passed to Salt Lake County by virtue of it. (Proposed con-
clusion No. 2, Tr. 20) 
Error No. 14. 
That the trial court erred in not concluding as a mat-
ter of law that the payment by Defendant for a purported 
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tax deed to said property, extinguished the lien for unpaid 
taxes, and that said tax deed conveyed no interest to De·-
fendant, and that Plaintiff is the owner of the fee title to 
the same. (Proposed conclusion No. 3. Tr. 20) 
ErrorNo.15. 
That the trial court erred in not concluding as a mat-
ter of law that the Plaintiff's predecessor in interest to said 
property, under the provisions of Section 104-2-7, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, held constructive possession of said 
property for seven months of the seven-year period im-
mediately prior to the commencement of this action, as re-
quired by Section 104-2-5, Utah Code Annotated 1943. 
(Proposed conclusion No.4, Tr. 20) 
Error·No. 16. 
That the trial court erred in not concluding as a mat-
ter of law that inasmuch as the· said property was not con-
veyed to the County of Salt Lake by Auditor's tax deed 
and was not struck off and sold to Salt Lake County, said 
property does not come within the provisions of Chapter 
19, page 22, Laws of Utah 1943, designated as Section 
104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended by 
Chapter 8, page 19, Laws of Utah 1947. (Proposed con-
clusion No. 5, Tr. 20 and 21) 
Error No. 17. 
That the trial court .erred in not concluding as a mat-
ter of law that inasmuch as Chapter 19, page 22, Laws of 
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Utah 1943, designated as Section 104-2-5.10, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, as amended by Chapter 8, page· 19, Laws 
of Utah 1947, does not provide· a reasonable time in which 
to bring actions for the recovery of real property conveyed 
to Salt Lake County prior to September 1st, 1939, which 
a.ccrued prior to the time of its enactment, is unconstitu-
tional and therefore void, insofar as the same relates to such 
property. (Proposed conclusion No. 6, Tr. 21) · 
Error No.· 18. 
1 - ...,..., • ~ 1, .:. 
That the .trial court erred in not concluding as a mat-
terQf law t~at Plaintitf is entitled to a decree of the court 
adjudging Plaintiff to be ~he owner q£ .said. property, and 
that Defendant has no right, title, estate, lien or interest 
whatever in said prope~ty. or any part thereof. (Proposed. 
conclusion No.7, Tr. 21} 
Error No. 19. 
That the trial court erred in not concluding as a mat-
ter of law that Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of the· court 
forever enjoining and debarring Defendant from asserting 
any claim whate·ver in or to said property adverse to the 
Plaintiff. (Proposed conclusion No. 8, T r. 21) 
Error No. 20. 
That the trial court erred in not concluding as a mat-
ter of law that Plaintiff is. entitled to a decree of the court 
for all costs of court. (Proposed conclusion No. 9, Tr. 21) 
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Error No. 21. 
That the judgment of the trial court in favor of the 
Defendant and against the Plaintiff, uno cause for action," 
and dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice (Tr. 
31) is contrary to law. 
Error No. 22. 
That the judgment of the trial court barring and en-
joining the Plaintiff from hereafter prosecuting or main-
taining any action for the recovery of the said property or 
for the possession of any pa·rt or portion thereof (Tr. 31), 
is contrary to law. 
Error No. 23. 
That the judgment of the trial court awarding De-
fendant its costs herein (Tr" 32). is contrary to law. 
Error No. 24. 
That the trial court erred in not decreeing that the 
Plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of said property and that 
the Defendant has no right, title, interest, estate or lien 
wh~ever in or to said property or any part thereof. (Tr. 
22) 
Error No. 25. 
That the trial court erred in not decreeing that the 
Defendant be forever enjoined and debarred from assert-
ing any claim whatever in or to the said property adverse 
to the Plaintiff. (Tr. 22) 
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Error No. 26 . 
. That ·the trial court erred in ·not decreeing costs to 
.the Plaintiff. (Tr. 22) 
Error No. 27. 
That the trial court erred in denying Plaintiff's mo-
tion for a new trial. (Tr. 3 5) 
ARGUMENT NO. 1 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SIGNED AND FILED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Even a cursory examination of the :findings signed 
and :filed by the trial court leads one to the conclusion that 
the court was very careless in the terminology therein 
used, and completely disregarded undisputed evidence in-
troduced by stipulation between the opposing parties. As 
a result, these findings· are contrary to the evidence, as 
indicated below: 
(a) In paragraph 6 of said :findings (Tr. 26), the 
court twice used the expression uconveyed or purported 
to convey", referring to Plaintiff's chain of title to the 
property concerned. The actual facts were that the fee 
title was traced down to February 29th, 1936, at which 
time it was in Mindwell C. Hunter, who on that date con-
veyed it to Irene Hunter Chamberlain, Plaintiff's predeces-
sor in interest (Tr. 46). At that time, not even the audit-
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or's tax deed, which later in this brief will be shown as 
void (Argument No. 2), had been exe.cuted. Then, on 
November 21st, 1947, the said Irene Hunter Chamberlain; 
now with the surname of McAlpine, quit-claimed to the 
Plaintiff (Tr. 47, and Exhibit uA", Tr. 79), and thereby 
conveyed to Plaintiff all her right, title and interest to the 
property. (Section 78-1-12, Utah Code Annotated 1943.) 
Thus, the trial court, had it followed the evidence, 
should have found that Mindwell C. Hunter executed a 
bargain and sale deed conveying the property to Irene 
Hunter Chamberlain, who, under the surname o£ Mc-
Alpine, by quit-claim deed, conveyed all her right, title 
and interest to the Plaintiff, which findings were proposed 
by the Plaintiff (Tr. 18). 
(b) The trial court, in paragraphs 7, .9, and 13 of its 
findings, used the expression ((treasurer's sale", ~nd referred 
to the property as having been u-sold" for the· 19 3 0 de-
linquent taxes (Tr. 27 to 29). As a matter of fact and of 
law, as will be shown later (Arugment No.2), the treasur-
er's sale was void for lack of the proper auditor's affidavits 
in the assessment rolls (required by Sections 5982 and 6006, 
Compiled Laws of Utah 1917, known as Sections 80-7-9 
and 80-8-7, Utah Code Annotated 1943). Only a purport-
ed sale took place, and the findings should have so stated, 
as was proposed by the Plaintiff in its findings No. 7 and 
9 (Tr. 18 and 19). 
(c) Again in its findings Nos. 7, 12 and 13 (Tr. 27 
to 29), the trial court used grossly misleading terms. The 
court repeatedly referred to the property as having been 
ustruck off and sold" to Salt Lake County. Also, in para-
graph 12, the court made a finding to the effect that the 
provisions of Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 
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1933, urelating to property being struck off to the County" 
(Tr. 28 and 29), when amended by Chapter 101, Laws of 
Utah 1939 uwere transferred to and embodied in Section 
' 80-10-68, sub. 6." This is an absolute mis-statement of the 
fact and of the provisions of the law, as will now be shown. 
Section 80-10-66, which provided the method of fore-
closing the tax lien prior to September 1st, 19 3 9, does not 
even contain the expression ustruck off and sold". To ac-
complish the foreclosure, it directs the county auditor to 
convey to the county by auditor's tax deed all property 
sold at the treasurer's sale, which remains unredeemed at 
the expiration of the redemption period. Also, there is no 
sale therein provided. This statute remained effective until 
September 1st, 19 3 9. 
However, the 1939 Legislature completely revised the 
procedure to foreclose the tax lien. Chapter 101, Laws of 
Utah 1939, referred to in paragraph 12 of the trial court's 
findings, to accomplish this purpose, repealed the provis-
ions relating to the execution of the auditor's tax deed. In 
fact, the last nineteen lines of Section 80-10-66, which pro-
vide·d for the auditor's tax deed, were deleted in the amend-
ed enactment of said Section. Section 80-10-68 was enacted 
in its stead, and provides for a public crying auction sale 
to be held by the county auditor each May, of properties 
remaining unredeemed at the expiration of the redemption 
period. Not one clause of those nineteen deleted lines men-
tioned above was incorporated into 80-10-68, or any sub-
division therein contained. This new foreclosure statute, 
for the first time, provides for the striking off and selling 
tax properties to the county (Section 80-10-68 ( 6)). 
In the case at bar, an auditor's tax deed was executed. 
The property ne·ver was ustruck off and sold" to the coun-
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ty. 1-.o find that it was is not only untrue, but is using an 
expression which cannot be found in the statutes in effect 
at that time. In addition, for the trial court to find that 
the provisions in effect prior to September lst, 19 3 9 (Sec-
tion 80-10-66), were transferred to and embodied in Sec~ 
tion 80-10-68 ( 6), is absolutely false. 
Thus, the trial court should have found, merely, that 
an auditor's tax deed was issued on March 31st, 1936, which 
conforms to the evidence, and which was proposed by 
Plaintiff (Tr. 18 and 19). 
(d) The trial court found, in paragraph 9 of its find-
ings (Tr. 27 and 28), that the Defendant upurchased" 
the property from the county. This is not true. As will be 
pointed out in Argument No. 2 herein, where supporting 
cases will be cited, no interest passed to the Defendant at 
die time it paid for, and received the county deed. The 
only legal effect of this transaction was to discharge any 
lien that may have theretofore existed (Argument No.2). 
(e) The trial court, in paragraph No. 9 of its find-
ings, again failed to follow the undisputed evidence, as it 
found that the Defendant unegotiated" for the property 
in question in the summer of 1941. Absolutely no evidence 
appears any place in the transcript of testimony to support 
such a finding. 
Thus, it must be concluded that the findings signed 
and :filed by the trial court served only to confuse the real 
issues, and a false foundation was thereby laid for the con-
clusions of law and judgment which followed. On the 
other hand, the :findings as proposed by the Plaintiff not 
only avoided useless repetition (see paragraphs 10 to 14 of 
the trial court's :findings, Tr. 28 and 29), but set forth the 
ultimate facts produced at the trial. Consequently, these 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
findings should have been signed and filed by the trial court. 
Having now disposed of Errors No. 1 to 7, inclusive, 
the foundation is laid for a discussion of the principles of 
law applicable to the fact situation which is before this 
Court. 
ARGUMENT NO. 2. 
DEFENDANT'S TAX TITLE IS DEFECTIVE 
The true . facts which should have been found by the 
trial court being that the fee title on February 29th, 1936, 
descended to Irene· Hunter Chamberlain, and that she quit-
claimed on November 21st, 1947, to the Plaintiff, the next 
logical step is to determine whether the tax title of the 
Defendant cuts off the· rights of the Plaint,iff's predecessor 
in interest, and therefore, the Plaintiff itself. 
Briefly, it is the position of the Plaintiff that the 
treasurer's sale on December 22nd, 1930, was void; that 
the· subsequent auditor's tax deed dated March ~1st, 1936, 
also was void; and, consequently, that the Defendant re-
ceived no interest in and to the property by virtue of the 
county deed to it dated November 7th, 1941. 
The· stipulated evidence shows (Tr. 69 and 70), and 
the trial court found (Finding No. 8, Tr. 27) that the two 
auditor's affidavits required by Se.ctions 5982 and 6006, 
Compiled Laws of Utah 1917 (Sections 80-7-9 and 80-8-7, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943) were not attached to the 
assessment roll for the year 1930. 
The Plaintiff respectfully refers this Court to the fol-
lowing cases: Telonis v. Stale·y, 104 Utah 537, 144 Pac. 
(2) 513; Tree v. White, 171 Pac. (2) 398; Petterson v. 
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Ogden City, 176 Pac. (2) 599·; Equitable Life and Casualty 
Insurance Co. v. Schoewe, 1 0 5 Utah 5 69, 144 Pac. ( 2) 
52 6. In all of these Utah cases, the lack of either of the two 
auditor's affidavits has been held to be fatal to the treasur~ 
er's sale and the auditor's tax deed. In the Equitable Life 
& Casualty Insurance Co. v. Schoewe case, supra, the court 
on page 527 stated: uwe hold that both of these auditor's 
affidavits are essential, and that both must be executed 
and attached to the assessment roll . . . . . By reason of the 
failure of the County Auditor to execute and attach his 
affidavits to the assessment roll as required by the statutes, 
the tax sale for the year 1936 was invalid, and the tax deed 
issued to Plaintiff and Appellant is likewise invalid." 
Thus, in the instant case, the treasurer's sale of the 
property for the unpaid 1930 taxes, and the subsequent tax 
deed issued by the county auditor on March 31st, 1936, are 
invalid. Consequently, the conveyance by the county on 
November 7th, 1941, to the Defendant is void and of no 
effect. 
The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant, when it 
received the county deed on November 7th, 1941, received 
absolutely no interest whatever in and to the property con-
cerned. In Anson v. Ellison, 140 Pac. ( 2) 6 53, another 
Utah case, wherein the tax title was held to be void, and 
the holder thereof attempted to assert a lien for the taxes 
originally assessed and which he had paid, this Court said: 
uThe lien which is given to the County is a right to resort 
to the property for the tax debt, but where the tax debt 
is paid by a sale to a private purchaser, the debt is paid and 
the right to resort to the property is gone. There is no right 
to resort to the property for a reimbursement of the pur-
chase p·rice paid to the County. The statute gives no such 
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right nor does the law. The principle of caveat emptor 
applies·." Please· see also Sorensen v. Bills, 70 Utah 509, 
261 Pac. 450, and Reeve v. Blatchley, 106 Utah 259, 147 
Pac. (2) 861, at page 863. 
There is but one conclusion: Inasmuch as no interest 
passed to the Defendant by virtue of the county deed, the 
fee title remained in Irene Hunter Chamberlain McAlpine, 
who, on November 21st, 1947, quit-claimed all her inter-
est to the Plaintiff. Thus, the trial court should have signed 
and filed paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Plaintiff's proposed con-
clusions of law (fr.· 20), as set out in Errors No. 12, 13 
and 14, to the effect that the treasurer's sale and the tax 
deed were null arid void; that no interest passed to the De-
fendant by the county deed; and that the Plaintiff is the 
owner of the fee title. 
ARGUMENT NO. 3. 
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 104-2-5, UTAH 
CODE ANNO·TATED 1943. 
The next logical step in the discussion of the respective 
rights of the Plaintiff and the Defendant in and to the 
property concerned, is to determine whether the rights 
of the Plaintiff have been cut off by any one of the sev-
eral statutes of limitation relied upon by the Plaintiff. The 
first one considered herein is Section 1 04-2-5, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, referred to in Defendant's Amendment 
to Amended Answer (Tr. 14), which the trial court ig-
nored in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
The Amendment to Amended Answer, as set up by 
the Defendant (Tr. 14), alleges in substance that n~either 
the Plaintiff nor its predecessor in interest was seised or 
possessed of the property within seven years of the com-
mencement of this action. 
The Plaintiff relies upon the provisions of Section 
104-2-7, Utah Code Annotated 1943, which provides, in 
substance, that the possession of real property is presumed 
to be in the one establishing a legal title to the property, 
and that the occupation of the same by any other person 
shall be deemed to have been under and in subordination to 
the legal title, unle~s it shall affirmatively appear that the 
property has been held and possessed adversely to the legal 
title for seven years before the commencement of the 
action. 
In the instant case, Plaintiff's predecessor had legal 
title, as shown in Argument No. 2, to which the Plaintiff 
succeeded. The Defendant did not take possession until 
August, 1941. This action was filed on January lOth, 1948 
(please see reverse side of Complaint, Tr. 2), which was six 
years and five months afterwards. Thus, the :first seven 
months of the seven-year period prior to the bringing of 
this action must be credited to the Plaintiff's predecessor. 
Consequently, the provision of Section 104-2-5, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, requiring possession within seven years, 
has been met, and the trial court should have so concluded 
as a matter of law, as propose·d by Plaintiff in conclusion 
No. 4 (Tr. 20), and referred to in Error No. 15. 
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ARGUMENT NO. 4. 
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION DOES NOT COME 
WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 19, 
PAGE 22, LAWS OF UTAH 1943, DESIGNATED 
AS SECTION 104-2-5.10, UTAH CODE AN-
NOTATED 1943. 
For the purposes of this brief, Appellant appends 
names to the statutes concerned, as follows: 
Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, 
which. provided the· procedure to foreclose the county tax 
lien by an auditor.'s tax deed, shall be referred to as the 
((Auditor's Tax D·eed Statute". 
The Section known as 80-10-68 ( 6), Utah Code An-
notated 1943, which became effective September 1st, 1939, 
and which replaced the Auditor's Tax Deed Statute as the 
m·ea~s· of foreclosing county tax liens, by providing that 
all proporties not struck off to the public at a public, cry-
ing auction sale in May of each year, shall be struck off 
and sold to the county by the county auditor, shall be 
called the uStruck Off and Sold Statute". 
Chapter 19, page 22, Laws of Utah 1943, designated 
as Section 104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 1943, which 
provides a four-year limitation period on property struck 
off and sold to the county under the Struck off and Sold 
Statute (Section 80-10-68 (6)), shall be called the 
uStruck Off and Sold Limitation Statute." 
The said Struck O·ff and Sold Limitation Statute (Sec-
tion 104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 1943) as amended 
by the· provisions of Chapter 8, page 19, Laws of Utah 
1947, whereby the limitation statute is extended to include 
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property conveyed to the county prior to September 1st, 
1939, under the Auditor's Tax Deed Statute (Section 
80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933), shall be called 
the ucombination Limitation Statute." 
In considering Plaintiff's Errors No. 8 and 16, it is 
contended by the Plaintiff that the Struck Off· and Sold 
Li1nitation Statute, by its own provisions, excludes the 
property concerned in this action. 
The Struck Qf:!_and Sold Limitation Statute (Chap-
ter 19, page 22, Laws of Utah 1943, designated as Section 
104-2-5.10, Utah COde Annotated 1943) reads as follows: 
uNo action for the recovery of real property struck 
off and sold to the county, as provided by section 80-10-68 
(6), Utah Code Annotated 1943, or for the possession 
thereof shall be maintained and no defense or counter-
claim to any action involving the recovery of p.roperty, or 
the defense of title to property, sold at such tax sale, or 
public or private sale, or for possession thereof, shall be set 
up or maintained, unless the same be brou-ght or set up 
within four years from date on which the sale was held. 
Provided, however, that an action may be maintained or 
defense set up within four years from the effective date of 
this act with respect to real property sold prior to said ef-
fective date." 
As will be observed, this Struck Off and Sold Limita-
tion Statute,.· by its own provisions, is very limited in its 
scope. In the first place, it includes only property foreclosed 
under the provisions of the Struck Off and Sold Statute 
(Section 80-10-68 ( 6)). No reference is made to property 
conveyed to the county under the Auditor's Tax Deed 
Statute. 
Secondly, this Struck Off and Sold Limitation Statute 
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does not pretend to protect the assignee of the county's 
interest in the original treasurer's sale, after he secures his 
tax deed. Neither does it protect the public who buys in at 
the crying auction sale under the provisions of the Struck 
Off and Sold Statute (Section 80-10-68 ( 4) and (5)). 
It only protects the .county in regard to property which is 
struck off and sold to it. · 
There is another point about this statute that must 
not be overlooked, as it is vital in determining its applica-
tion. The limitation period therein provided runs from 
the u date on which the sale was held". Also, an action or 
defense is permitted within four years from the effective 
date of the act uwith respect to real property sold' prior to 
said effective date." 
The Court's attention is respectfully called to the fol-
lowing expressions in the Struck Off and Sold Limitation 
Statute: c:c:sold. at such tax sale"; ufrom the date on which 
the sale was held"; ((real property sold prior to said effective 
date"; ureal property struck off and sold to the county, 
as provided by section 80-10-68 ( 6), Utah Code Annotat-
ed 1943." These expressions are consistent, only, with one 
conclusion: The Struck Off and Sold Limitation Statute 
is a limitation statute on prop~erty ustruck off and sold" 
to the county under the provisions of the Struck Off and 
Sold Statute, and on none· other. 
This conclusion becomes more certain when one con-
siders the Struck Off and Sold Statute and the Auditor's 
Tax Deed Statute, which it replaced in 1939. Each of these 
two tax lien foreclosure statutes provides a distinct method 
of foreclosing the tax lien. The procedure in each is entire-
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ly different from that of the other, not only in manner, 
but also in the timing of the requirements and events there·-
in set forth. 
In view of the foregoing, it would defy all reason to 
conclude that the Struck Off and Sold Limitation ~tatute, 
specifically referring only to property struck off and sold 
to the county under the provisions of the Struck Off and 
Sold Statute by section number, includes, also, property 
conveyed to the county under the Auditor's Tax Deed 
Statute. 
In the instant case, the foreclosure of the alleged. tax 
lien took place March 31st, 1936, under the Auditor's Tax 
Deed_Statute {Section 80-10-66, Revised Statutes of Utah 
1933), several years before the Struck Off and Sold Statute 
was enacted. The property never was struck off and sold. 
It necessarily follows that no date of sale can be established 
from which the limitation period can run. Only an invalid 
auditor's tax deed was executed as shown in Argument No. 
2 herein. 
As a result, there is but one final conclusion. The Plain-
tiff's a.ction does not come within the provisions of Chap-
ter 19, page 22, Laws of Utah 1943, designated as Section 
104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 1943, herein called the 
Struck Off and Sold Limitation Statute. Thus, the trial 
court was in error in concluding as a matter of law that 
this statute did bar Plaintiff's action {Error No. 8) , but 
should have concluded otherwise {Error No. 16) as pro-
posed by the Plaintiff (Tr. 20 and 21). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
ARGUMENT NO. 5. 
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION DOES NOT COME 
WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 19, 
PAGE 22, LAWS OF UTAH 1943, DESIGNATED 
AS SECTION 104-2-5.10, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 1943, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 8, 
PAGE 19, LAWS OF UTAH 1947. 
In proper sequence, the next issue to discuss is. wheth-
er or not the property in the case at bar comes within the 
provisions of th~ Combination Limitation Statute, which 
is the original Struck Off and Sold Limitation Statute as 
amended by the 1947 Session Laws, which reads as follows: 
uNo action for the recovery of real property struck 
off and sold to the County under the provisions of Section 
80-10-68 (6), u·tah Code Annotated 1943, or conveyed 
to the County prior to September 1, 1939, by auditor's 
deed under the provisions of Section 8 0-10-66, Revised 
Statutes of Utah 193 3, or for the possession thereof, shall 
be maintained, and no counterclaim for the recovery of 
such property or for the possession thereof shall be inter-
posed unless the same be brought or interposed within four 
years from the date of such sale, or within four years from 
the date of the issuance of such auditor's deed." 
Having already eliminated that part of the statute 
quoted above which refers to property ustruck off and sold 
to the County" (Argument No. 4), we now pass on to 
consider whether the new provision relating to auditor's 
tax deeds applies to the property in question. 
In the instant case, the purported treasurer's sale in 
1930 and the auditor's tax deed predicated thereon, which 
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was executed March 31st, 1936, are invalid, as shown con-
clusively in Argument No. 2. Briefly, at the time the pur-
ported treasurer's sale was made, the county only had a 
lien for the unpaid taxes, which continued to the date of 
the auditor's tax deed. As concluded in Argument No. 2, 
the tax deed being invalid, the county still only had a lien 
for the unpaid taxes. In other words, the execution of the 
auditor's tax deed in 1936 to Salt Lake County made abso.;. 
lutely no change in the status of the property nor that of 
the parties concerned, and conveyed nothing whatsoever 
to the County, being a nullity. The supporting cases are 
set out in said Argument No.2, and will not be repeated in 
this argument. 
Consequently, the property in question, having never 
been conveyed to the County of Salt Lake by auditor's tax 
deed or otherwise, does not come within the express pro-
visions of this Combination Limitation Statute. Thus, 
this statute does not apply to the case at bar, and the trial 
court should have so concluded as a matter of law, cited 
herein as Errors No.9 and 16, and which was proposed by 
Plaintiff (Proposed conclusion No. 5, Tr. 20 and 21). 
ARGUMENT NO. 6. 
SECTION I 04-2-6, AS AMENDED BY 
CHAPTER 20, PAGE 22, LAWS OF UTAH 
1943, DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFF'S AC-
TION. 
Section 104-2-6, as amended by Chapter 20, page 22, 
Laws of Utah 1943, reads as follows, that part of which 
was added by said amendment being shown in italics: 
uNo cause of action, or defense or counterclaim to an 
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action, founded upon the title to real property or to rents 
or profits out of the same, shall be effectual, unless it ap-
pears that the person prosecuting the action, or interpos-
ing the defense or counterclaim, or under whose title the 
action is prosecuted or defense or counterclaim is made, or 
the an.cestor, predecessor or grantor of such person was 
seised or possessed of the property in question within seve~ 
years before the committing of the act in respect to which 
such action is prosecuted or defense or counterclaim made; 
provided, however, that with respe.ct to actions involving 
real property held under tax deed, the action mus.t be 
brought or defense or counterclaim interposed within the 
time prescribed by section 104-2-5.10 of this code." 
· ·This act is so drawn, that ((with respe.ct to actions in-
volving real property held under tax deed," defenses as 
well as actions themselves are barred. Thus, should this 
Court apply this section to Plaintiff's action as a bar, it 
should also apply it to the Defendant's defense as a bar, 
and it, in e·ffect, becomes a nullity. 
The amendment to Section 104-2-6 was enacted at 
the same session of the Legislature at which the Struck Off 
and Sold Lhnitation Statute was enacted. It is very evi-
dent that its purpose· was to make special provision in Sec-
tion 104-2-6 for property uheld under tax deed", and in 
so doing, refers to the Struck Off and Sold Limitation 
Statute for the limitation period and the kind of tax 
properties. to which it applies. 
Thus, the property conc~erned is placed right ba.ck into 
the provisions of the Struck O·:ff and Sold Limitation Statute 
and the Combination Limitation Statute. These matters 
have been discussed at length in Arguments No. 4 and 5 
herein, and will not be· r~epea ted. 
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However, the conclusion is just the same. The 
property in this case was neither ustruck off and sold to the 
County", nor was it conveyed to the county under au-
ditor's tax deed. Consequently, neither does Section 104-
2-6, as amended by Chapter 20, page 22, Laws of Utah 
1943, apply to it, and the trial court should have so held 
(Error No. 10). 
In Argument No. 7, it will be shown that the Com-
bination Limitation Statute is unconstitutional, and, there-
fore, is void. This being the case, then the unconstitution-
ality of it will also affect the validity of Section 104-2-6, 
insofar as the same relates to property conveyed to the 
county by auditor's tax deed. 
ARGUMENT NO. 7. 
CHAPTER 19, PAGE 22, LAWS OF UTAH 
1943, DESIGNATED AS SECTION 104-2-5.-
10, UTAH CO·DE ANNOTATED 1943, AS 
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 8, PAGE 19, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1947, IS UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL, INSOFAR AS THE SAME RE-
LATES TO· PROPERTY CONVEYED TO 
THE COUNTY BY AUDITOR'S TAX DEED 
PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 1st, 1939. 
The original enactme·nt of Section 104-2-5.10, herein 
referred to as the Struck Off and Sold Limitation Statute, 
passed by the 1943 L·egislature as Chapter 19, page 22, 
provided a four-year limitation period for property struck 
off and sold to the county as provided by the Struck Off 
and Sold Statute, Section 80-10-68 (6), and for none 
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other (Argument No.4). Prior to that time, one attempt-
ing to uphold a tax title was required to rely upon seven 
years of adverse possession. But this statute, insofar as 
property struck off and sold to the county was concerned, 
reduced the limitation period from seven years of adverse 
possession, to the expiration of a four-year period from the 
date the property was struck off and sold to the county, 
without any requirement of adverse possession. However, 
the Struck Off and Sold Limitation Statute, by its express 
terms, provided four years in which to bring actions on 
property sold prior to the effective date of the act. 
But when the 1947 Legislature amended the Struck 
Off and Sold Limitation Statute by Chapter 8, page 19, 
Laws of Utah 1947, herein called the Combination Limita-
tion Statute, it enlarg,ed its provisions to include property 
conveyed to the county by auditor's tax deed prior to Sep-
tember 1st, 1939, under the provisions of Section 80-10-66, 
the Auditor's Tax Deed Statute. This had the effect of 
reducing the limitation period on actions involving this 
class of properties from seven years ... of adverse possession, 
to the expiration of a four-year period from the date of 
the execution of the auditor's tax deed, without any re-
quirement of adverse possession. But unlike the Struck 
Off and Sold Limitation Statute, the Combination Limita-
tion Statute did not provide any time in which to bring 
actions which had accrued prior to the effective date of 
the act. In fact, inasmuch as more than four years had 
elapsed between September 1st, 1939, after which no 
auditor's tax deeds were issued to the county under the 
Auditor's Tax Statute, and May 13th, 1947, the effective 
date of the Combination Limitation Statute, its effect was 
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to cut off completely and summarily, all actions on such 
property without exception. 
It is herein conceded that the Legislature may re·duce 
the limitation period on legal actions. But it is contended 
by the Plaintiff that in so doing, th=e Legislature must 
provide a reasonable time in which to file actions which 
theretofore had accrued, which the Utah Legislature failed 
to do in this instance, or the statute·, insofar as it relates to 
such actions, is unconstitutional. 
In support of this proposition, the Plaintiff cites 34 
Am. Jur. pages 33 and 34, under the title uLimitations of 
Action", paragraph 28, uShortening of Statutory Period," 
which reads in part as follows: 
uunless forbidden by the State Constitution, the 
legislature may constitutionally shorten periods of limita-
tion :fixed by previously existing statutes, and make the 
amendment applicable to existing causes of action, pro-
vided a reasonable time is left in which such actions may 
be commenced. The question as to what shall be consider-
ed such a reasonable time is for the determination of the 
legislature, and is in no sense a judicial question. Unless 
the time allowed is so manifestly insufficient that it be-
comes a denial of justice, the court will not interfere 
with the legislative discretion. 
u ••• It is clear, however, that a statute which declares 
that a period already lapsed shall bar an action upon a con-
tract is an arbitrary destruction of contractual rights, and 
therefore, unconstitutional, as would also be a statute 
which practically denied a party the right to sue on an 
existing cause of action, by shortening the period of limita-
tions without leaving a reasonable time thereafter in which 
to bring the action." 
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These same principles are announced in 12 Am. Jur., 
Constitutional Law, paragraph 445, uStatutes of Limita-
tion"; also in Mulvey v. Boston, 197 Mass. 178, 83 N. E. 
402, and many other cases cited in the footnotes of both 
citations in Am. Jur., supra. 
In Chapman v. Douglas County, 107 U. S. 348, 
27 L. ed. 378, 2 S. Ct. 62, the court held that an existing 
right of action cannot be taken away by shortening the 
period of limitation to a time which has already run. 
In Gilbert v. Ackerman, 139 N.Y. 118, 53 N. E. 753, 
45 LRA 118, the court said (page 120): 
u ••• The only restriction upon the legislature in the 
enactment of statutes of limitation is that a reasonable 
time be allowed for suits upon .causes of action therefore 
ex1sttng. Rexford v. Knight, 11 N. Y. 308; People v. 
Turner, 117.·N. Y. 227. The question of reasonableness, 
naturally and primarily, is with the legislature; and. when 
the question is brought before the court the surrounding 
circumstances are regarded in determining whether the 
legislature, in prescribing a period of limitation, has erred 
to the prejudice of substantial rights. Th,e claim against 
another is property; and if a statute of limitations, acting 
upon that right, deprives the claimant of reasonable· time 
within which suit may be brought, it violates the con-
stitutional provision that no person shall be deprived of 
property without due process of law." 
This lack of providing a reasonable time in which to 
bring actions which had accrued before the effective date 
of a limitation statute, wherein the period is shortened, 
has been held, universally, to be a violation of the udue 
process" clause of the Federal Constitution, and of the 
constitutions of the various states. In fact, so universal is 
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this principle of law, that no case to the contrary can be 
found. 
In the case at bar, our Legislature, in enacting the 
Combination Limitation Statute, not only failed to pro-
vide a reasonable time in which to file actions which had 
theretofore accrued, but declared a period already lapsed 
to bar such actions. In view of the authorities hereinabove 
cited, which adhere to a universal principle of constiutional 
law, this Combination Limitation Statute is in violation of 
the due process clause of the Constitution of the Unite~ 
States (Amendment XIV), and of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah (Article I, Section 7). 
Thus, insofar as the said Combination Limitation 
Statute (Chapter 19, page 22, Laws of Utah, 1943, des~ 
ignated as Section 104-2-5.10, Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
as amended by Chapter 8, page 19, Laws of Utah 1947) 
relates to property conveyed to the county by auditor's 
tax deed prior to September 1st, 1939, it should have been 
declared unconstitutional by the trial court, as proposed 
by the Plaintiff in its conclusion No. 6 (Tr. 21). In failing 
so to do, the said trial court erred (Error No. 17}. 
ARGUMENT NO. 8. 
DEFENDANT IS NOT. ENTITLED TO AF-
FIRMATIVE RELIEF. 
The Defendant, in its Amended Answer (Tr. 12), 
prays uthat said plaintiff be hereafter forever enjoined and 
debarred from asserting any claim whatever in or to said 
property adverse to defenda~t." The Amended Answer 
(Tr. 10 to 12, inclusive) and the Amendment to the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
Amended Answer (Tr. 14), do not contain a counter-
claim nor a cross-complaint. The Defendant merely 
pleaded specially to each paragraph of the Complaint, and 
then set up an affirmative defense. 
Plaintiff contends that inasmuch as no counterclaim 
was set up by the Defendant, and no fee paid to the county 
clerk therefor, the said Defendant was not entitled to a 
judgment barring and enjoining the Plaintiff from here-
after prosecuting or maintaining any action for the re-
covery of the property concerned ( Tr. 31 ) , and the trial 
court was in error in granting such -affirmative relief (Er-
ror No. 22). 
SUMMARY 
By way of recapitulation, the Plaintiff summarizes 
the foregoing arguments as follows: 
1. The trial court grossly disregarded undisputed, 
stipulated evidence, thereby laying a false foundation for 
conclusions of law and judgment, ~§_.Jpll._Qws: 
(a) The trial court should have found that Irene 
Hunter Chamberlain McAlpine had the fee title, which 
she quit-claimed to the Plaintiff. 
(b) The :findings that a utreasurer's sale" took 
place and that the property was usold" for the 1930 
delinquent taxes, are not supported by the law and the evi-
dence. 
(c) The findings that the property was ustruck off 
and sold" to the county, and that certain provisions of the 
Auditor's Tax Deed Statute were transferred to and in-
corporated into the Struck Off and Sold Statute, are not 
true. 
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(d) The finding that Defendant upurchased" the 
property from the county is not supported by the law and 
the evidence. 
(e) No evidence exists in the transcript that De-
fendant unegotiated" for the property in the summer 
of 1941. 
2. The treasurer's tax sale and the auditor's tax deed 
predicated thereon are void for lack of the two auditor's 
affidavits required by law; nothing was conveyed by the 
county to the Defendant by virtue of the county deed; 
and Plaintiff, t~erefore, is the owner of the fee title. 
3. Plaintiff is not barred by Section 104-2-5, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, as its predecessor in in.terest had 
possession during seven months of the seven-year period 
preceding the filing of this action. 
4. Plaintiff's action is not barred by the provisions of. 
the Struck Off and Sold Limitation Statute, for the reason 
that the property, having been the subject of an auditor's 
tax deed and having not been struck off and sold to the 
county, does not come within the provisions of said statute. 
5. Plaintiff's action does not come within the pro-
visions of the Combination Limitation Statute, for the 
reason that the tax deed was invalid, and no conveyance 
of the property to the county took place, as required by 
the provisions of said statute. 
6. Plaintiff's action is not barred by the provisions 
of Section 104-2-6, as amended by Chapter 20, page 22, 
Laws of Utah 1943, for the reason that said statute refers 
to the provisions of the Struck Off and Sold Limitation 
Statute and the Combination Limitation Statute, which 
are shown herein not to apply, the latter being unconstitu-
tional. 
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7. Plaintiff's a.ction is not barred by the prov1s1ons 
of the Combination Limitation Statute, for the reason that 
said statute violates the due process clause of both State 
and Federal Constitutions, in not providing a period of 
time in which to file actions which accrued prior to its 
effective date. 
8. The Defendant, having not pleaded a counter-
claim, should not have been granted affirmative relief. 
CONCLUSION 
. In view of the foregoing arguments, there is no alter-
native but to conclude ~that the Plaintiff succeeded to the 
fee.·.ti~le_ to' the .property concerned, and that said title of 
Plaintiff is not abrogated. by any of the statutes of limita-
tion relied upon by the Defendant. Thus, in the instant 
cas~, the Plaintiff and not . the Defendant, s~ould have 
prevailed and been granted judgment by the trial court 
quieting its title in and to this property. . 
Thus, it follows naturally, logic~lly, and without fur-
ther argument; that the trial court should have concluded 
as matters of law, in addition to those set out in the fore-
going arguments, and should have rendered judgment, 
as follows: 
The trial court should not have concluded and 
adjudged in favor of the Defendant uno cause of action" 
(Tr. 31), cited herein as Errors No. 11 and 21. 
The trial court should have concluded and rendered 
judgment that Plaintiff is the owner of said property, and 
that Defendant has no right, title, estate, lien or interest 
whatever in the same, as proposed in Plaintiff's conclusion 
No. 7 and paragraph No. I of Plaintiff's proposed judg-
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ment (Tr. 21 and 22), cited as Errors No. 18 and 24, and 
should have enjoined said Defendant from asserting any 
claim to the same adverse to the Plaintiff (Plaintiff's pro-
posed conclusion No.8, and proposed judgment, paragraph 
No.2, Tr. 21 and 22), cited herein as Errors No. 19 and 25. 
The trial court should have concluded and rendered 
judgment awarding costs to the Plaintiff, as proposed by 
Plaintiff's conclusion No. 9, and judgment paragraph 
No. 3, and not to the Defendant (Tr. 21, 22 and 32), and 
cited herein as Errors No. 20, 23 and 26. 
Because the findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
judgment as signed by the trial court are contrary to the 
facts and the law, the said court should have granted 
Plaintiff's motion for a new trial (Tr. 34 and 3 5), cited as 
Error No. 27. 
For the reasons set forth herein, the Plaintiff and. 
Appellant contends that the judgment of the trial court as 
made and entered, together with the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law upon which the same is predicated, 
are not supported by the stipulated and undisputed evi-
dence, and are contrary to law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM D. CALLISTER, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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